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“Aesthetic Primitives”: Fundamental Biological 
Elements of a Naturalistic Aesthetics 
Ellen Dissanayake 
In the last fifteen years or so, researchers in neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and 
cognitive science have turned their attention to art and aesthetics. There are now 
recognized sub-fields called neuroaesthetics and evolutionary aesthetics1, and books 
and articles by cognitive scientists have appeared concerning, for example, «the artful 
mind» (Turner [2006]) and «the aesthetic faculty» (Deacon [2006]). 
Although I welcome the interest of scientists and social scientists in such an 
important and widespread area of human behavior – art making and appreciation – I 
find in general that their pronouncements are peculiarly unsatisfying to someone like 
myself who has been concerned with the arts (of all kinds) in all times and places, 
including the evolutionary past, and with exploring their universality and probable 
adaptive value. 
Although neuroaesthetics, evolutionary aesthetics, and cognitive aesthetics are 
based in biology and human evolutionary history, many of their studies use works of 
recent European art – not the arts of premodern or ancestral groups – to illustrate what 
art is and how aesthetic experiencing works. In these studies, the two subjects («art» 
and «aesthetics»), as used, frequently have fuzzy boundaries and are often not defined. 
The terms may be used interchangeably, or «aesthetics» (used as a psychological term 
to refer to preferences or choices) is assumed to have relevance to «art», even though, 
as Brown and Dissanayake (2009) have phrased it: «Art is more than aesthetics and 
aesthetics is more than art». 
 
1
 Neuroaesthetics identifies aesthetic functions and investigates their neurobiological causes 
(Skov, Vartanian [2009]: 3); evolutionary aesthetics describes preferences that shape behavioral 
choices and guide us to adaptive ends (Grammer, Voland [2003]). 
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That is to say, the complex and controversial referents of the modern label «art» 
(whether making or experiencing it) are broader and richer than the preferences 
described by evolutionary psychologists or the «aesthetic» features discovered by 
neuroscientists. And «aesthetics», as addressed by psychologists and scientists in 
general, is broader than any category of art phenomena, since it applies to choices and 
preferences about anything we perceive – things that may have nothing to do with art. 
A serious omission in these new fields is that for the most part, the aesthetic 
experience and art behavior of pre-modern (and ancestral) humans is not part of the 
discourse, even though these people and societies comprise the vast majority of humans 
to have practiced art behaviors and to have responded (aesthetically or in other ways) 
to arts. Additionally, the cognitive and linguistic bias of these fields typically disregards 
the importance of emotion (affect) and emotional communication in art making and 
response. As a result, I have found that their writings insufficiently appreciate nonverbal 
or preverbal, nonsymbolic or presymbolic, intermodal, participative, affinitive, and 
intersubjective aspects of aesthetic experience and art behavior (Dissanayake [2009]; 
Franzini, this volume). 
In this chapter, I do not deal in detail with these problems that pervade neuro-, 
evolutionary, and cognitive approaches to aesthetics. Taking another tack, I offer a 
preliminary but promising new approach to developing a naturalistic aesthetics. 
1. What Is a Naturalistic Aesthetics? 
Recent discoveries in genetics, human evolution, evolutionary psychology, 
paleoarchaeology, and neuroscience call for new approaches to traditional philosophical 
subjects such as metaphysics (being, the mind), epistemology (knowledge), ethics 
(morality), and aesthetics (beauty, value, judgment, taste) that historically have been 
addressed with what might be called «top down» (mentalistic, analytic, and linguistic) 
methods. 
In this paper, I describe a «bottom up» approach – building upon the findings of the 
fields mentioned above as well as behavioral biology (ethology) and ethnographic 
knowledge about the arts in premodern and prehistoric societies. I believe that all these 
subject areas are important in understanding why humans first made and responded to 
the arts. With a naturalistic approach, it is possible to consider anew questions such as 
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what is art? where did it come from? what is aesthetic experience? what is good art? is 
art important? are there universals in art or aesthetic experience2? 
I begin by suggesting seven overlapping premises (or axioms) that underlie a 
«bottom-up» approach to human art and aesthetics. 
1. A naturalistic aesthetics begins with biology, the recognition that needs for survival 
and reproduction have shaped human bodies and minds – our physiology, psychology, 
and behavior – as they have for every living creature. 
2. Anthropology and archaeology contribute to the recognition that all humans alive 
today and from ca. 200 thousand years ago are members of the same genus, Homo. 
Raised from infancy in any culture, any modern human would grow up to be a 
participating member, accepting the values and customs of that culture, including their 
making and experiencing arts3. 
3. Adult psychology and experience grow from and build upon inborn motives and 
preferences. Although all humans are cultural creatures, being acculturated is a 
requirement of their biology: becoming cultural is biologically predisposed. 
4. Traditional aesthetics has historically emphasized aesthetic experience more than 
making or physically participating in art – that is, «aesthetics» has often referred to a 
private, essentially passive «mental» experience. A naturalistic view will treat art as an 
adaptive or evolved behavior, a universal predisposition, such as mother-infant 
attachment, play, courtship, adult pair or group bonding, and language. Aesthetic 
behavior (as an overarching term) is concerned with appreciation as reception 
(perceptual, emotional, cognitive) but also includes art making and participation. On the 
other hand, the abstract category «art», referring vaguely to works or objects with 
qualities such as beauty or skill or creativity, is a «top-down» attribution that is not 
helpful to a naturalistic aesthetics that is concerned with an evolved behavioral 
predisposition. 
5. Evolved behaviors (actions) arise, like other biological processes, from brain 
activity whose biological purpose is to motivate and reward appropriate responses – to 
 
2
 Such a reformulation does not imply that traditional aesthetics is irrelevant or unimportant. 
Some individual subjects (e.g., criticism of individual works within a specific local or historical 
tradition) will not require the long viewpoint described here.  
3
 I am aware that epigenetic and other factors (Jablonka, Lamb [2006]) within the last ten 
thousand years have contributed to genetic changes in physiology (e.g., ability in some to digest 
cow’s milk). However, significant changes to brain circuitry, cognition, social temperament 
(Churchland [2011]: 21), and emotions that motivate and reward nurturance, sociability, need for 
others, play, and so forth. (Panksepp [1998]) cannot be easily altered in a social animal such as 
ourselves. 
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things that are good (positive) or bad (negative) for us. The «top down», «mental» 
analyses of traditional aesthetics are replaced by knowledge of «bottom up» experience 
that is at once behavioral, cognitive, and emotional. A «behavior» of caretaking of 
infants is an evolved capacity for performing various activities (suckling, holding, 
cuddling, rocking, reassuring, protecting, comforting) in response to specific emotional 
and cognitive experience (witnessing tears or hearing cries of distress, feeling 
tenderness and love). Similarly, a behavior of art can be conceptualized as an evolved 
capacity for performing various activities in response to specific emotional and cognitive 
experience (see «Why is art important?» below). 
6. Because art behavior occurs in all known cultures, it is reasonable to assume that 
this proclivity is universal (that is, biologically predisposed) in all members of the species 
(which is implied in calling it «adaptive», as in Axiom 4)4. 
7. Neuroscientists sometimes use the term «primitives» to describe basic elements of 
perceptual (psychosensory) experience in any sense modality. Insofar as aesthetic 
behavior, as described in this paper, includes art making and participation as well as 
aesthetic experience and appreciation, I propose additional somatic and behavioral 
primitives that are also fundamental to aesthetic behavior5. 
2. Psychosensory “Primitives” 
Neuroscientists have identified the primary visual cortex (Area VI) as the part of the 
brain that seeks out the most basic kinds of visual information – straight lines, edges, 
contours (curves, right angles), and dots, which provide evidence for actual solid bodies 
in the world (Hodgson [2006]). In the next major area (V2), these basic features are 
assembled into coherent shapes. Processing past this point produces more sophisticated 
aspects of visual perception, such as separating an image from its background, providing 
color, movement, and so forth (Hodgson [2006]: 56). Similar separate «primitives» in the 




 This is not the place to describe Darwinian theory or the processes of adaptation or selection. 
Interested readers are invited to read various summaries of evolutionary theory and adaptive 
explanations of art (e.g., Boyd et al. [2010]: 1-122; Dissanayake [2008]). 
5
 Somatic and behavioral primitives, as described in this article, are not neurologically as «basic» 
as psychosensory primitives. I use the term «primitives» to indicate that they are nevertheless 
fundamental evolved elements that predispose humans to «aesthetic behavior» – that is, to 
participate in art making and to respond to the arts of others. 
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One might think of Gestalts as a kind of psychosensory primitive in visual and aural 
modalities, as they are immediate and satisfying to perception and cognition – elements 
such as conciseness, proximity, similarity, continuity in time and space, conjoint spatial 
or temporal movement – as in the visual complexities of Balinese painting or the aural 
«carpet» of temporally-experienced rhythms or sounds in Balinese (or Central African) 
music (Apfelauer [2011]), and so forth. 
Humans are also predisposed to respond to colors and their easily learned 
associations, which are sometimes near-universal – e.g., red with blood, white with milk 
or purity, black with death (e.g., Fernandez [1973]) or the dynamics of sound and their 
emotional associations (e.g., low or high pitch, faint, loud, looming, piercing, soothing, 
accelerating, slow, and so forth). 
Our brains have evolved to perceive in this manner so that we can make sense of 
what we see, hear, and otherwise experience. Some strong percepts travel directly to 
the amygdala in the lower brain, causing an emotional response before the «executive» 
brain in the frontal lobes can analyze and identify the context and meaning. Their 
biological purpose is to make us respond appropriately – that is, positively or negatively 
– to things that are good or bad for us. They direct us to affordances (Gibson [1979]), 
those things in our physical and social environments that we need to seek out and pay 
attention to in order to survive6. 
Scholars of neuroaesthetics describe how perceptual primitives underlie our 
appreciation of visual art (Hodgson [2000, 2006, 2013]; Solso [1994]; Ramachandran and 
Hirstein [1999]; Zeki [1999]; Voland and Grammer [2003]; Verpooten and Nelissen 
[2012]). Neuroscientist Derek Hodgson (2006), for example, proposes that primitives 
may appeal to us aesthetically because, as inherent features of the brain, they come to 
connote what has been safe, secure, and understood; they provide order in the midst of 
disorder; and they convey a sense of pattern and harmony in the midst of the chaos and 
confusion of nature. Certainly features such as straight lines, edges, contours, geometric 
shapes, and contrast attract attention, give cognitive satisfaction, and can be used or 
«parasitized» (Hodgson [2012]) by artists. 
We should not forget, however, that perceptual or psychosensory primitives underlie 
our identification and appreciation of any complex visual stimulus and such studies do 
not make clear how, for instance, neurovisual resonance (Hodgson [2006]) to a 
modernist abstract painting is different from looking at a window, dart board, row of 
 
6
 Other creatures (e.g., frogs, birds, insects) have different wavelengths of light and sound to 
which they immediately respond with reference to their own biological affordances. 
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telephone poles, or a line drawing illustration from a catalogue of machine parts. 
Primitives are not art, but ingredients of art. To be «art», something more has to be 
done to them. 
Scholars in evolutionary aesthetics (e.g., Miller [2000, 2001]; Thornhill [2003]) 
similarly claim aesthetic relevance to our evolved preferences for discrete traits or 
actions in the service of adaptive choices of mates or habitats. I do not find that these 
views contribute much to a philosophical understanding of art, noting that like 
perceptual primitives, signals in landscapes or mates (or anything else) that indicate 
adaptive value are aesthetic only in the rudimentary sense that our brains are 
predisposed to be attracted immediately to them. Again, they are ingredients of art, but 
require further «operations» that make them art. 
Costly signaling (e.g., Miller [2000, 2001]; Voland [2003]) is a concept from 
evolutionary psychology and evolutionary aesthetics, derived from the theory of sexual 
selection (Darwin [1871]). It has to do with high degrees of beauty, skill, or virtuosity, 
displayed by males, which immediately attract the attention of females for mating. The 
Ur-example is of the peacock where only a very fit male can bear the physiological cost 
of maintaining and erecting a splendid, heavy tail or the physical handicap of dragging 
such an impediment around, not to mention the hazard of evading predators. By 
analogy, art behavior in humans is sometimes called «costly» because it requires time, 
energy, and material resources and does not obviously appear to contribute to primary 
survival. However, the concept of costly signaling can be applied to many contexts, not 
only art. Evolutionary aesthetics does not suggest how an art context is different from a 
sports or debating context nor does it account for the observation that art behavior, like 
language (another adaptation) is adaptive for everyone, not just a few superior males 
who use it competitively. 
3. Other “Bottom-Up” Primitives 
To my knowledge, neither neuroaesthetics nor evolutionary aesthetics has addressed 
other kinds of fundamental feeling states and early-developing activities that contribute 
– even more than psychosensory primitives—to adult experience of the arts. Some 
somatic states inherent in bodily life and some infant and child behaviors that arise 
developmentally could also be considered as primitives. Like psychosensory primitives, 
they are not only noteworthy elements in aesthetic behavior and experience, but also 
occur in non-aesthetic perception and behavior. Unfortunately, in a short article there is 
only space to mention, but not fully describe, these. 
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4. Somatic Primitives 
In The Corporeal Turn (2009), American interdisciplinary philosopher Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone has collected her writings over forty years that integrate phenomenology 
with ontogeny and phylogeny. Her development of provocative ideas such as animation, 
thinking in movement, kinetic qualia, and corporeal consciousness, among others, 
describe primitives of the body and bodily life that are fundamental to formulating a 
naturalistic aesthetics. Her discussion of the term «embodied» as «a lexical band-aid 
covering a three-hundred-fifty-year-old wound generated and kept suppurating by a 
schizoid metaphysics» (p. 215) is just one of many provocative calls for a new «bottom 
up» way of thinking about unified body-mind experience and activity, especially 
prominent in the arts. 
Developmental psychologist Daniel Stern (1999, 2010) has described what he calls 
«vitality affects» in infants – feeling states that result from movement, dynamics, and 
temporal progression of experiences that can be captured by words such as «surging», 
«fading away», «fleeting», «exploding», «effortful», «accelerating», «decelerating», 
«climaxing», «bursting», and «drawn out» (1999: 68), terms that can be applied to 
several sensory modalities. In a similar vein, psychologist Howard Gardner (1972, 1973) 
in his early work, described somatic experiential states of infants, calling them modes 
and vectors (see also discussion in Dissanayake [1988]: 145-148), and I have more 
recently called comparable bodily states rhythms and modes (Dissanayake [2000]: 6-7). 
At least some experiencers of art will probably recognize unverbalizable states or 
associations like these as relevant in their responses to works of art7. 
5. Behavioral Primitives 
In addition to psychosensory and somatic primitives I suggest that there are evolved 
behavioral primitives that predispose us to participate in and respond proto-
aesthetically to formal attributes in visual, vocal, gestural, and literary artifacts. These in 
themselves are not art or aesthetic responses but predispositions that are used in art 
behavior. 
One is the ability to entrain – to keep time to an external pulse (Phillips-Silver and 
Keller [2012]; Phillips-Silver et al. [2010]), which can be observed in some young children 
 
7
 Philosopher Susanne Langer famously said that music is the tonal analogue of emotive life 
(Langer [1953]: 27), echoing a remark attributed to Princeton philosopher of art, Carroll Pratt 
(«music sounds the way emotions feel»). For a critique of Stern’s concept of vitality affects, see 
Køppe, Harder, Væver (2008). 
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as early as two and a half years when encouraged by actions such as practicing 
drumming with a social partner (Kirschner and Tomasello [2008]). The capacity to 
entrain, absent in other mammals, enables humans to move synchronically with other 
people as in dance and song, and to detect manipulations of a beat, setting up 
expectations that may be used or experienced aesthetically. 
Another behavioral primitive is the predisposition in young children to draw and 
make marks. Universally, this proclivity follows a sequential course of making circular 
motions, dots, and scribbles with the whole arm, then more controlled scribbles from 
which emerge forms that resemble visual primitives and their combinations8. These 
include deliberate circular forms, meanders, straight lines (horizontal, vertical, diagonal), 
sets of parallel lines and crossed lines, arcs, radials, spirals, and geometric shapes in an 
infinite variety of arrangements and constructions that seem to indicate «a kind of 
universal, innate visual grammar» (Engle in jacket comment for Fein [1993], see also 
Fein [1993]). Eventually, with adult encouragement, children use these basic elements 
to draw figurative objects – people, animals, and objects in the environment such as 
houses or vehicles. It is interesting to observe that children’s earliest marks are much 
the same as the earliest known human marks on small pieces of ochre or broken 
fragments of ostrich egg shell containers made seventy to a hundred thousand years ago 
(Dissanayake [2014]). 
Moving one’s body regularly to an external pulse and using one’s hand and fingers to 
make marks with an implement on a surface are activities that are pleasurable and 
satisfying. They often look like play, which, as a category, might also be called a 
behavioral primitive that easily merges into art and aesthetic behavior, whether it be 
motor, social, linguistic, or imaginative. In all its variety, in every child, play behavior 
appears without being taught. 
Another behavioral primitive that has not received the recognition and study that it 
deserves requires description: what I have called «making special» and, more recently, 
«artification» – the two terms can be used interchangeably. A brief outline of this 
behavioral proclivity follows. 
6. Making Special (“Artification”) 
From at least two hundred and fifty thousand years ago, the archaeological record 
indicates that species of Homo showed a capacity to deliberately make ordinary things 
 
8
 The forms that emerge in children’s earliest scribbling are also remarkably similar to drawings of 
phosphenes of adults (Kellogg, Knoll, Kugler [1965]). 
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in the world extra-ordinary or «special». Natural surroundings (cave walls, rock 
outcroppings, boulders, small pieces of stone), common artifacts (e.g., tools), and 
probably ordinary bodies (skin, hair) were made special with engraved or painted marks. 
It is likely that special vocalizations (called by us, song) and movements (dance) also 
occurred at least this early, although they leave no material trace. 
Before deliberately making something special, it is necessary to recognize 
specialness. An example of this ability in early hominins is evident at least as early as 
285,000 years ago in the attraction to red ochre pigment (McBrearty [2001]: 92). 
Although recognizing specialness is not necessarily aesthetic or artful – any animal can 
recognize that something departs from habitual or familiar experience – early Homo 
(from at least 250 thousand years ago) seems to have noticed unusual minerals, stones, 
and fossils, picked them up, and transported them to their dwellings (Dissanayake 
[1988]: 96-97; Oakley [1973])9. Also at this early date, there are at least two known 
instances in which a stone tool was fashioned with an already embedded fossil in a 
central position, as well as a number of sites with hammered cup-shaped depressions on 
stone surfaces. By at least 100,000 years ago, humans were regularly using ochre 
pigment (Henshilwood et al. [2011]) and by 77,000 years ago pierced marine shell beads 
(Vanhaeren et al. [2006]), to make their bodies, possessions, and surroundings special. 
7. The Evolutionary Origin of Making Special (Artification) 
My hypothesis of the evolutionary origin of artification is difficult to summarize briefly 
and it requires some knowledge of several subjects that are often unfamiliar to 
philosophers of art – human evolutionary history, the process of ritualization in certain 
bird species, human ethology, cognitive archaeology, the neuroscience of affiliation, 
developmental psychology of infants, and the phenomenon of exaptation as a variant of 
adaptation. By synthesizing knowledge from these fields, I have developed a hypothesis 
that the «aesthetic» behaviors or predispositions of artification were exaptations from 
earlier adaptive behaviors that contributed to survival and reproductive success in the 
evolution of Homo sapiens and possibly earlier hominins. 
 
9
 The behavior seems to resemble that of contemporary pack rats or jackdaws, who are innately 
attracted to shiny things that they pick up and carry to their nests. However, we don’t know what 
objects attracted these animals before aluminum foil and other manmade material became 
available. 
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I trace the phylogenetic origin of making special in humans to consequences of two 
early adaptations in human evolution. The first is bipedality (e.g., Potts [1996]). 
Numerous anatomical adaptations were required over several million years of evolution 
to convert a quadrupedal knuckle-walker into an upright strider10. 
A second significant trait, brain enlargement, began about two and a half million 
years ago with the emergence of the genus Homo. By the time of Homo habilis, between 
two million and one-and-a-half million years ago, the brain had doubled in size from that 
of earlier four-legged forms. Another spurt of brain growth and doubling of size 
occurred around a half million to two hundred thousand years ago (Mithen [1996]: 11)11. 
Among the anatomical changes required by bipedality was a reshaped pelvis that 
became shortened from top to bottom and broadened from fore to rear in order to 
center the trunk over the hip joints and thereby reduce fatigue during upright bipedal 
locomotion (Klein and Edgar [2002]: 52-53). This reconfiguration secondarily resulted in 
a serious obstetric problem – giving birth to an increasingly large-brained baby through 
an increasingly narrowed birth canal12. Further anatomical adaptations addressed this 
difficulty13, and the period of gestation became reduced, thereby ensuring a smaller 
infant head. 
To conform to the general primate pattern, human babies should be born at around 
18 months (Tomasello [2003]). After only nine months gestation, they are extremely 
helpless at birth and for several years thereafter (Falk [2009]), requiring intensive 
maternal care. I have proposed that another important behavioral adaptation helped to 
ensure this essential care: interactive behaviors between infant and mother that created 
an emotional bond. The behaviors include special vocalizations, facial expressions, and 
 
10
 For example, the spine was reshaped and the opening of the spinal cord relocated, the lower 
limbs and feet altered, joint surfaces reconfigured, body musculature reshaped, and the rib cage 
(and even the tiny bones of the inner ear) were reconstructed. 
11
 Bailey and Geary (2009) provide strong empirical evidence that human cranial capacity 
increased systematically with population density that led to competition between groups. 
Neural/behavioral mechanisms to increase cooperation within these competing groups would 
have been advantageous. (See «Why is Art Important?» in Conclusion, below). 
12
 H. ergaster had a narrower pelvis than its predecessor, H. habilis, in which rapid brain 
expansion was occurring between two to three million years ago (Wade [2006]: 18-22). «Turkana 
Lad», a specimen of H. erectus of 1.6 million years ago, also has a narrow pelvis (Falk [2009]: 51).  
13
 Anatomical changes included a female pubic symphysis that separates slightly during 
childbirth; a neonate skull that is compressible at birth; and alteration of the timing of the 
infant’s brain growth: in the first four years, it becomes three times larger than at birth 
(Portmann [1941]). 
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head and body movements directed by mothers to infants, who are born ready to 
respond to these signals and even to elicit them. 
These bonding behaviors are all derived from universal adult signals of friendliness 
and accord, as described by psychotherapists and ethologists (Grant [1968, 1972]; Eibl-
Eibesfeldt [1989]): Look At and Open Eyes express interest; Raised Eyebrows and 
Backward and Upward Head Lift indicate familiarity; Head Nods show agreeableness; 
Open Mouth or Smile show receptivity, pleasure, liking, and appeasement; Mutual Gaze 
displays intimacy, Soft Melodious Voice, non-threat or submission, and Touch, Stroke, 
Pat, Hug, and Kiss are physical gestures of sympathy and devotion. When used by 
mothers with infants, however, all these ordinary visual, vocal, and gestural signals of 
affinity are made distinctive or special. They are simplified or formalized (sustained and 
stereotyped), exaggerated (e.g., enlarged) and repeated, often with dynamic variation 
and elaboration (made louder, softer, faster, slower, larger, smaller). Also unlike their 
precursors, they are used only with infants (and, after wild animals were domesticated, 
some child-substitutes, pets). As infants mature, they become bored with the soothing 
pace of their early months and desire to engage in games such as Peek-A-Boo or This 
Little Piggy, in which the mother uses these signals to manipulate the infant’s 
expectation within a shared temporal continuum. 
Although mother and baby are simply enjoying each other’s company, awash in 
loving feelings, the mother’s emphatic signals of friendly interest are, unknown to her, 
reinforcing her brain’s neural circuits for affiliation and devotion and augmenting the 
release in her brain of prosocial hormones that foster maternal behavior in all mammals 
(Panksepp [1998]). Making these signals thereby ensures that she will want to care for a 
demanding, helpless creature for months and years14. Compared to mothers who did 
not make emphatic affinitive signals that reinforced such devotion, an interactive 
mother was more likely to have reproductive success. By eliciting such signals from its 
mother and encouraging her to keep making them, an interactive baby, compared with 
less responsive infants, inadvertently helped to ensure maternal care and therefore its 
own continuing survival. 
I consider this dyadic interaction to be a behavioral adaptation in hominins that 
evolved to address the problem of ensuring continued care of highly altricial infants15. 
With minor variations, mother infant interaction as just described can be observed 
 
14
 See Scherer, Zentner (2001) for a description of biofeedback. 
15
 The trend toward difficult births and greater infant altriciality was well underway about 1,8 to 
1,6my in H. ergaster (Falk [2004]: 499; Mithen [2005]) and H. erectus (Flinn, Ward [2005]: 31). 
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worldwide (Dissanayake [1999]: 376-379; Falk [2009]). When such an interaction is 
absent or unreliable, infants’ physical, social, emotional, and cognitive development is 
compromised – as recently and unfortunately was evinced in emotionally neglected 
children who had been raised from early weeks or months in some Eastern European 
orphanages before the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
What does this behavioral adaptation from a million years ago have to do with 
formulating a naturalistic aesthetics today? To answer this, I now introduce another 
biological, specifically adaptive process in other animals, the ritualization of behavior, 
which, like mother-infant interaction, uses communicative signals that have been made 
special. 
8. Proto-Aesthetic Devices of Ritualized Behaviors 
In the biological process called ritualization, a movement from a practical, ordinary 
context (say, self-grooming or flapping the wings before flight) becomes altered so that 
attention is drawn to it, and it then communicates a new social message. No longer does 
a drake’s preening indicate simply cleaning his feathers, but when ritualized, this action 
means «Notice me: I want to mate with you». Wing-flapping, when ritualized, no longer 
indicates preparation for flight but means «This is my territory and I will defend it». 
Ritualized behaviors are typically used in agonistic or cooperative and affinitive contexts. 
In its ritualized form, the precursor behavior (such as self-grooming or wing-flapping) 
has been subjected to various alterations that make it look as well as mean something 
different from its ordinary functional meaning. These manipulations, or «operations», 
include (1) simplification or stereotypy, (2) repetition (usually with a «typical intensity» 
(Morris [1957]), a set regularity and pace), (3) exaggeration in time (longer or shorter, 
faster or slower), space (larger or smaller, higher or lower), or volume (loud, soft,) (4) 
elaboration (striking evolved accoutrements of color or form), and (5) manipulation of 
expectation. These features (which usually overlap) make the signal conspicuous 
(«special») thereby attracting attention, sustaining interest, and arousing, shaping, and 
molding emotion (Eibl-Eibesfeldt [1989]: 439-440). 
Mothers’ unusual vocal, facial and kinetic movements to infants can be seen as 
derived from ordinary adult affinitive signals and are, in essence if not fact, ritualized 
(Dissanayake [2006]: 38)16. Adults spontaneously and universally perform these altered, 
 
16
 I have suggested that mother-infant interaction is a ritualized behavior in humans (Dissanayake 
[2000], [2006]: 38). Ericson ([1976]: 694) calls «the greeting between mother and baby» the 
Ellen Dissanayake, “Aesthetic Primitives” 
pag. 17 
© Firenze University Press • Aisthesis • 1/2015 • www.fupress.com/aisthesis • ISSN 2035-8466 
special or more-than-ordinary signals to babies, who demonstrate (with smiles, wriggles, 
and coos) that they decidedly prefer them to ordinary adult communication. 
I suggest that these same alterations of ritualized behaviors (here called 
«operations») are used by artists to make things special and as such can be thought of, 
abstractly, as «aesthetic primitives», with neural substrates and correlates. In animals 
and babies, they are not yet «art», rather as the psychosensory, somatic, and behavioral 
primitives described earlier or the preferences revealed by evolutionary aesthetics are 
not art. However, they may well become ingredients of art – that is, elements that an 
artifier uses intentionally to make something special. As said earlier, in order to become 
art, something has to be done to an object, movement, environment, occasion, or 
theme17: that is to say, they are artified with the operations just described. 
What I have called somatic (body state) and behavioral primitives (capacities to 
entrain, to make marks, to play, and to artify) have been largely overlooked by biological 
and evolutionary studies of the arts. Being nonverbal – often unverbalizable – and 
suffused with emotion, they are difficult to study and even to describe. However, I 
suggest that they are intrinsic to and should be recognized as essential to any 
formulation of a naturalistic aesthetics. There may well be other components that I have 
missed. 
9. Answers to Perennial Questions about “Art” 
Readers may have noted that mine is a formal theory of the nature of art experience 
and making, as contrasted with an emphasis on content (symbolic or thematic subject 
matter) or individual and personal expression. This emphasis on formal aspects derives, I 
think, from considering art as a behavior of doing something to ordinary reality to make 
it more than ordinary – thereby attracting attention, sustaining interest, and evoking 
and shaping emotion, having an effect. Artification is participative, not only reactive. 
In the introduction I listed questions whose answers follow from the axioms of a 
naturalistic aesthetics and from various somatic and behavioral primitives that easily 
motivate and influence art making and participation. 
 
«ontogenetically earliest ritualization in man [sic]». I have not found any other reference to this 
behavior as being ritualized. 
17
 In stories, innately appealing and biologically important themes that have to do with danger, 
adventure, triumph over adversity, achieving and maintaining high status, or finding a mate are 
made special. 
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What is art? A behavior of art can be conceptualized fundamentally as an evolved 
capacity (called «artification») for making ordinary reality extraordinary or «special», 
unlike the everyday18. Perceptual, thematic, bodily, and behavioral primitives are artified 
by means of «aesthetic operations» (formalization, repetition, exaggeration, 
elaboration, and manipulation of expectation) in response to biologically-important 
circumstances in which the artifier has an emotional investment (i.e., cares). I invite 
skeptical readers to challenge this characterization by naming artworks or art behaviors 
that do not fit this description.  
Where did art come from? (What was its evolutionary origin?) Artification makes use 
of proto-aesthetic elements or operations that originated in adaptive ancestral mother-
infant interactions along with psychosensory, somatic, and behavioral primitives, as 
described, and the evolved preferences identified in evolutionary aesthetics. In 
themselves these are not art, but ingredients of art. 
What is aesthetic experience? Aesthetic experience is a response to what is done to 
the ordinary subject, object, or their components by means of (proto-aesthetic) 
operations, not simply a response to the primitives themselves. 
What is good art? This is a question for other scholars that I see as depending in large 
part on cultural contexts. Universal standards for components of various arts such as 
«good» proportion, beauty of form and color, affecting harmonic progression or melodic 
contour, and the like are relevant to aesthetic value but beyond the scope of my 
evolutionary scheme of naturalistic aesthetics as it currently exists. 
Why is art important? What does art «do» for people? I trace the origin of intentional 
artification to early humans’ participation in ritual ceremonies. Despite homogeneity 
and routine, subsistence lives are subject to anxiety about daily sustenance and safety. 
Uncertainty leads to physiological and neuroendocrine responses that may negatively 
affect brain development, genetic expression, and other factors necessary to survival 
and reproduction. But when supportive social ties are in place, these stress responses 
decrease (Taylor [2002]: 13). The most supportive social tie of all is that between 
mother and infant (Keverne et al. [1999]), and it seems reasonable to suggest that 
participation in ceremonial arts, which makes use of the mechanisms evolved to enable 
mother-infant mutuality, would contribute to the coordination, conjoinment, and 
 
18
 «Making special» and its five operations are echoed by cognitive scientist Per Aage Brandt 
(2006) in his use of such words as «specia», «extraordinary», «elaborated», and «excess 
structure». 
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emotional reassurance of their adult participants, providing a sense of social support 
and of coping that ameliorates the deleterious effects of the stress response. 
Ceremonial ritual behavior in all human groups is performed primarily at times of 
transition and uncertainty that concern obtaining or maintaining goods, achieving 
successful outcomes to ventures, and avoiding threats to well-being. Interestingly, this 
evolved and adaptive motivation to preserve goods and withstand dangers has resulted 
in ritual (that is, artified) behavior in human groups everywhere. 
When used in a group’s ceremonies, the components of artification (formalization, 
repetition, exaggeration, elaboration, and manipulation of expectation in visual, vocal, 
and gestural modalities) possess inherent beneficial neurological effects that relieve 
anxiety (reduce cortisol), instill confidence and trust (release of oxytocin), and promote 
group coordination and oneheartedness (release of oxytocin and dopamine). In 
prehistoric times, neural-behavioral mechanisms to enhance cooperation would have 
been highly adaptive (see footnote 11). 
Today, artification may provide the same results to individuals when 
making/participating; hence, the benefits of arts therapies, such as the treatment of 
trauma through neurobiologically-informed relational non-verbal communication 
(Chapman [2014]). Although much contemporary art is often deliberately «conceptual», 
anarchic, and private, its makers, like their Pleistocene predecessors, continue to artify 
important things and to make ordinary reality extraordinary. 
Are there universals in art or aesthetic experience? Scholars in evolutionary 
aesthetics, cognitive aesthetics, and neuroaesthetics have described widely-favored 
natural stimuli (e.g., kinds of textures, body configurations, colors, shapes, and so forth) 
that are «preferred» – chosen by humans as beautiful or attractive. Aesthetic primitives, 
introduced and briefly described for the first time here in somatic and behavioral 
modalities, add further «aesthetic» fundamentals, inherent in early sapiens, that 
influenced their earliest art making and aesthetic responses, as they continue to do 
today. The existence and persistence of universal aesthetic primitives, along with 
predisposed aesthetic preferences, contribute to establishing an evolved, adaptive, 
«bottom-up» or «naturalistic» aesthetics and demonstrate that as we became Homo 
sapiens, we were at the same time Homo aestheticus. 
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